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Researcher's Dilemma

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  • Bobtcheff, Catherine
  • Bolte, Jérôme
  • Mariotti, Thomas

Abstract

We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority. Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher, symmetric environment, the resulting preemption game has a unique equilibrium. We study how the shape of the breakthrough distribution affects equilibrium maturation delays. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them has contrasted effects on the quality of research outputs. Finally, when researchers have different innovative abilities, speed of discovery and maturation of ideas are positively correlated in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Bobtcheff, Catherine & Bolte, Jérôme & Mariotti, Thomas, 2013. "Researcher's Dilemma," IDEI Working Papers 763, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:26784
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mueller-Langer, Frank & Fecher, Benedikt & Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Gert G., 2019. "Replication studies in economics—How many and which papers are chosen for replication, and why?," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 62-83.
    2. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2015. "Fear Of Novelty: A Model Of Scientific Discovery With Strategic Uncertainty," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 1132-1139, April.
    3. Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2021. "Dynamic R&D competition under uncertainty and strategic disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 169-210.
    4. Sadler, Evan, 2021. "Dead ends," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    5. Baruffaldi, Stefano & Pöge, Felix, 2020. "A Firm Scientific Community: Industry Participation and Knowledge Diffusion," IZA Discussion Papers 13419, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Mohan, Vijay, 2019. "On the use of blockchain-based mechanisms to tackle academic misconduct," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Academic Competition; Preemption Games; Private Information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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