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Researcher's Dilemma

  • Bobtcheff, Catherine
  • Bolte, Jérôme
  • Mariotti, Thomas
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    We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority. Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher, symmetric environment, the resulting preemption game has a unique equilibrium. We study how the shape of the breakthrough distribution affects equilibrium maturation delays. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them has contrasted effects on the quality of research outputs. Finally, when researchers have different innovative abilities, speed of discovery and maturation of ideas are positively correlated in equilibrium.

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    File URL: http://www.tse-fr.eu/images/doc/wp/et/wp_tse_377_v3.pdf
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    Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 13-377.

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    Date of creation: Feb 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:26783
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    Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/

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    1. David Card & Stefano DellaVigna, 2013. "Nine Facts about Top Journals in Economics," NBER Working Papers 18665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Decamps, Jean-Paul & Mariotti, Thomas, 2004. "Investment timing and learning externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 80-102, September.
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    4. Morgan, John, 2004. "Clock Games: Theory and Experiments," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt81m0r0jj, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
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    7. Steven T. Anderson & Daniel Friedman & Ryan Oprea, 2010. "Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1778-1803, September.
    8. Reinganum, Jennifer F., . "On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 312, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    9. Francesco Squintani & Hugo Hopenhayn, 2005. "Preemption Games with Private Information," 2005 Meeting Papers 80, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
    11. Benjamin F. Jones, 2005. "The Burden of Knowledge and the 'Death of the Renaissance Man': Is Innovation Getting Harder?," NBER Working Papers 11360, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Lambrecht, Bart & Perraudin, William, 2003. "Real options and preemption under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 619-643, February.
    13. Levin, Sharon G & Stephan, Paula E, 1991. "Research Productivity over the Life Cycle: Evidence for Academic Scientists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 114-32, March.
    14. Gilbert, Richard & Harris, Richard G., 1984. "Competition with Lumpy Investment," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt11v5q20z, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    15. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
    16. Hendricks, Kenneth, 1992. "Reputations in the adoption of a new technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 663-677, December.
    17. Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
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