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Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions

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  • Lebrun, Bernard

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  • Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:1:p:97-110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 193-220.
    2. Lebrun, Bernard, 1996. "Existence of an Equilibrium in First Price Auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 421-443.
    3. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    5. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 381-392.
    6. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-142, February.
    7. Leamer, Edward E, 1981. "Is It a Demand Curve, or Is It a Supply Curve? Partial Identification through Inequality Constraints," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 319-327.
    8. Bernard Lebrun, 1996. "Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 421-443.
    9. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    10. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Yingyao & McAdams, David & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, pages 186-193.
    2. Leandro Arozamena & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 1-18.
    3. Anja Schöttner, 2008. "Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 57-71.
    4. Bobtcheff, Catherine & Bolte, Jérôme & Mariotti, Thomas, 2013. "Researcher's Dilemma," TSE Working Papers 13-377, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2015.
    5. de Castro, Luciano I. & de Frutos, María-Angeles, 2010. "How to translate results from auctions to procurements," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 115-118, February.
    6. Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
    7. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2007. "Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000831, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Anja Schöttner, 2008. "Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 57-71.
    9. De Chiara, Alessandro, 2015. "Holding an Auction for the Wrong Project," MPRA Paper 72108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Apr 2015.
    10. Lebrun, Bernard, 2009. "Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1341-1351.
    11. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Discussion Paper Series dp432, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    12. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2003. "Ratio Orderings and Comparative Statics," ESE Discussion Papers 91, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    13. de Frutos, M. Angeles, 2000. "Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 48-71, October.
    14. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
    15. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2006. "Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case," Discussion Paper Series dp432, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    16. Ed Hopkins, 2007. "Rank-Based Methods for the Analysis of Auctions," ESE Discussion Papers 173, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    17. repec:eee:inecon:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:134-142 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2009. "The effect of information on the bidding and survival of entrants in procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 56-72.
    19. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Non-Monotone Comparative Statics in Games of Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 122, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    20. Bernard Lebrun, 2006. "Auctions with Almost Homogeneous Bidders," Working Papers 2006_7, York University, Department of Economics.
    21. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B. & Kaplan, Todd, 2017. "Protection in government procurement auctions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 134-142.
    22. Kirkegaard, René, 2009. "Asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1617-1635.
    23. Mares, Vlad & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2014. "On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-40.

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