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2004
- 2004_03 Optimality And The Second-Price Auction With Resale
by Bernard Lebrun - 1 Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions
by Bernard Lebrun
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York University, Department of Economics
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Fax: (416) 736-5987
Web page: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/
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Series handle: RePEc:yca:dpaper
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