Numerical Solutions of Asymmetric, First-Price, Independent Private Values Auctions
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Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Bernard Lebrun, 1996. "Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 421-443.
- Florens, F. & Protopopescu, C. & Richard, J.-F., 1998. "Identification and Estimation of a Game Theoretic Models," Papers 98.499, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
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97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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- Donald, Stephen G. & Paarsch, Harry J., 1996. "Identification, Estimation, and Testing in Parametric Empirical Models of Auctions within the Independent Private Values Paradigm," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(03), pages 517-567, August.
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- Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers 1, York University, Department of Economics, revised May 2004.
- Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 439-454.
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