Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015.
"Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014.
"Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection,"
1406, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Roï¿½i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Working Papers 734, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro'i, 2017. "Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 11944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro'i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_18, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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- repec:eee:eecrev:v:95:y:2017:i:c:p:84-102 is not listed on IDEAS
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-228.
More about this item
KeywordsMechanism design; Cartel; Bidding ring; Linear programming; C61; C72; D44; K21; L41;
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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