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Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités

  • Forges, Françoise
Registered editor(s):
  • Biran, Omer

We study the question of collusion in auctions. We start by presenting a model of a first price auction with complete information and direct asymmetric externalities. Following a non-cooperative approach we study the negotiations process which yields a cartel. We show that in the presence of direct externalities the grand coalition may not form, proposing an example of an auction in which a small coalition forms in equilibrium. We continue by studying the stability (in the sense of the core) of coalitions in Bayesian games. We show that all coalitional equilibria can be made incentive compatible. We apply the notion of stability on standard auctions without direct externalities, establishing (mainly) the stability of the grand coalition. With direct externalities and complete information we show that the grand coalition (as well as small coalitions) may become unstable. We conclude by examining the notion of stability in second price auctions with direct externalities and incomplete information. We identify a class of tractable equilibria for these auctions for any given collusion scheme. Finally, in this model, we demonstrate the instability of the grand coalition in the presence of direct externalities, identifying (again) direct externalities as an obstacle to cooperation.

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This book is provided by Paris Dauphine University in its series Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine with number 123456789/7238 and published in 2011.
Handle: RePEc:dau:thesis:123456789/7238
Note: dissertation
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  1. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
  2. Bernard Caillaud & Philippe Jehiel, 1998. "Collusion in Auctions with Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 680-702, Winter.
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  13. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  14. Roger Myerson, 2004. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 659, Econometric Society.
  15. Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November.
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  19. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  20. Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1994. "Strategic Non-Participation," Discussion Paper Serie B 287, University of Bonn, Germany.
  21. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June.
  22. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  23. Waehrer, Keith, 1999. "Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 437-452, April.
  24. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
  25. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 141-145, Spring.
  26. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  27. Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
  28. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September.
  29. Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 125-42, February.
  30. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2008. "Bidding rings and the winner's curse," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1018-1041.
  31. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, E., 1997. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  32. Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
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