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Fear Of Novelty: A Model Of Scientific Discovery With Strategic Uncertainty

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  • Damien Besancenot
  • Radu Vranceanu

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecin12200-abs-0001"> This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientific potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholars' ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas . ( JEL O31, C72, A14)

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2015. "Fear Of Novelty: A Model Of Scientific Discovery With Strategic Uncertainty," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 1132-1139, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:2:p:1132-1139
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecin.2015.53.issue-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mikko Packalen & Jay Bhattacharya, 2017. "Neophilia ranking of scientific journals," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 110(1), pages 43-64, January.
    2. Mikko Packalen, 2019. "Edge factors: scientific frontier positions of nations," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 118(3), pages 787-808, March.
    3. Mikko Packalen & Jay Bhattacharya, 2018. "Does the NIH Fund Edge Science?," NBER Working Papers 24860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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