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Researcher’s Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Catherine Bobtcheff
  • Jérôme Bolte
  • Thomas Mariotti

Abstract

We propose and analyse a general model of priority races. Researchers privately have breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before disclosing them, thereby establishing priority. Two-researcher, symmetric priority races have a unique equilibrium that can be characterized by a differential equation. We study how the shapes of the breakthrough distribution and of the returns to maturation affect maturation delays and research quality, both in dynamic and comparative statics analyses. Making researchers better at discovering new ideas or at developing them has contrasted effects on research quality. Being closer to the technological frontier enhances the value of maturation for researchers, which mitigates the negative impact on research quality of the race for priority. Finally, when researchers differ in their abilities to do creative work or in the technologies they use to develop their ideas, more efficient researchers always let their ideas mature more than their less efficient opponents. Our theoretical results shed light on academic competition, patent races, and innovation quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine Bobtcheff & Jérôme Bolte & Thomas Mariotti, 2017. "Researcher’s Dilemma," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(3), pages 969-1014.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:84:y:2017:i:3:p:969-1014.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdw038
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    Cited by:

    1. Mueller-Langer, Frank & Fecher, Benedikt & Harhoff, Dietmar & Wagner, Gert G., 2019. "Replication studies in economics—How many and which papers are chosen for replication, and why?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 48(1), pages 62-83.
    2. Leonid Tiokhin & Minhua Yan & Thomas J. H. Morgan, 2021. "Competition for priority harms the reliability of science, but reforms can help," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 5(7), pages 857-867, July.
    3. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2023. "Pioneer, early follower or late entrant: Entry dynamics with learning and market competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    4. Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun & Katsenos, Georgios & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2023. "The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    5. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Azoulay, Pierre & Heggeness, Misty & Kao, Jennifer, 2025. "Medical research and health care finance: Evidence from Academic Medical Centers," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(2).
    7. Christoph Carnehl & Marco Ottaviani & Justus Preusser, 2024. "Designing Scientific Grants," Papers 2410.12356, arXiv.org.
    8. Sadler, Evan, 2021. "Dead ends," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Bobtcheff, Catherine & Levy, Raphaël & Mariotti, Thomas, 2021. "Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse ?," CEPR Discussion Papers 16024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Zhou, Beixi, 2024. "Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 141-166.
    11. Baruffaldi, Stefano & Poege, Felix, 2020. "A Firm Scientific Community: Industry Participation and Knowledge Diffusion," IZA Discussion Papers 13419, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Catherine Bobtcheff & Raphaël Lévy & Thomas Mariotti, 2025. "Information Disclosure in Preemption Races: Blessing or (Winner's) Curse?," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 56(2), pages 145-162, June.
    13. Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2021. "Dynamic R&D competition under uncertainty and strategic disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 169-210.
    14. Jean-Paul Décamps & Fabien Gensbittel & Thomas Mariotti, 2025. "Investment Timing and Technological Breakthroughs," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(2), pages 1478-1513, May.
    15. Xu, Boli, 2026. "Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), January.
    16. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2015. "Fear Of Novelty: A Model Of Scientific Discovery With Strategic Uncertainty," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 1132-1139, April.
    17. Mohan, Vijay, 2019. "On the use of blockchain-based mechanisms to tackle academic misconduct," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
    18. Groen-Xu, Moqi & Bös, Gregor & Teixeira, Pedro A. & Voigt, Thomas & Knapp, Bernhard, 2023. "Short-term incentives of research evaluations: Evidence from the UK Research Excellence Framework," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(6).
    19. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-01117929 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Yonggyun Kim & Francisco Poggi, 2025. "Strategic Concealment in Innovation Races," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_648, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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