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Analyse économique des fusions horizontales

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  • Patricia Charléty
  • Said Souam

Abstract

[fre] Cet article retrace l'évolution de l'analyse économique des fusions horizontales et examine sa portée pour la politique de la concurrence. Dans un contexte d'application très stricte des lois antitrust, l'article pionnier de Williamson [1968] s'est attaché à montrer que les coûts liés à la monopolisation d'une industrie devaient être comparés aux gains réalisés grâce aux opéra- tions de fusion. Les contributions qui ont suivi ont ré-examiné l'arbitrage fondamental relevé par Williamson sous des hypothèses plus réalistes. D'un côté, la prise en compte des réactions stratégiques des concurrents limite l'augmentation du pouvoir de marché pour les entreprises qui initient les opérations de fusion. D'un autre côté, le contexte d'information asymétrique dans lequel travaillent les autorités de la concurrence milite plutôt en faveur d'un durcissement des règles et nuance le message essentiellement libéral de Williamson. [eng] This article recalls the evolution of the economic analysis of horizontal mergers and examines its relevance for competition policy. In the context of a strict enforcement of antitrust laws, Williamson [1968], in a pioneer article, stressed that the costs inherent to the industry monopolization should be compared with the benefits resulting from mergers. Later contributions have reexamined the fundamental trade-off raised by Williamson under more realistic assumptions. On one hand, taking into account the strategic reactions of competitors sets limits to the increase in market power for the merging companies. On the other hand, the context of asymmetric information in which competition authorities work militates in favor of thougher regulations and lessens the rather liberal message of Williamson.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Charléty & Said Souam, 2002. "Analyse économique des fusions horizontales," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 17(2), pages 37-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_17_2_1460
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1460
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Bougette & Florent Venayre, 2008. "Contrôles a priori et a posteriori des concentrations : comment augmenter l'efficacité des politiques de concurrence," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 9-40.
    2. Sylvain Kadohognon Ouattara, 2011. "Incitations à fusionner dans un oligopole mixte asymétrique," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201126, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.

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