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Analyse économique des fusions horizontales

  • Patricia Charléty
  • Said Souam

[fre] Cet article retrace l'évolution de l'analyse économique des fusions horizontales et examine sa portée pour la politique de la concurrence. Dans un contexte d'application très stricte des lois antitrust, l'article pionnier de Williamson [1968] s'est attaché à montrer que les coûts liés à la monopolisation d'une industrie devaient être comparés aux gains réalisés grâce aux opéra- tions de fusion. Les contributions qui ont suivi ont ré-examiné l'arbitrage fondamental relevé par Williamson sous des hypothèses plus réalistes. D'un côté, la prise en compte des réactions stratégiques des concurrents limite l'augmentation du pouvoir de marché pour les entreprises qui initient les opérations de fusion. D'un autre côté, le contexte d'information asymétrique dans lequel travaillent les autorités de la concurrence milite plutôt en faveur d'un durcissement des règles et nuance le message essentiellement libéral de Williamson. [eng] This article recalls the evolution of the economic analysis of horizontal mergers and examines its relevance for competition policy. In the context of a strict enforcement of antitrust laws, Williamson [1968], in a pioneer article, stressed that the costs inherent to the industry monopolization should be compared with the benefits resulting from mergers. Later contributions have reexamined the fundamental trade-off raised by Williamson under more realistic assumptions. On one hand, taking into account the strategic reactions of competitors sets limits to the increase in market power for the merging companies. On the other hand, the context of asymmetric information in which competition authorities work militates in favor of thougher regulations and lessens the rather liberal message of Williamson.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1460
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_17_2_1460
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 17 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 37-68

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_17_2_1460
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1460
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/rfeco

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  1. Berger, Allen N. & Demsetz, Rebecca S. & Strahan, Philip E., 1999. "The consolidation of the financial services industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 135-194, February.
  2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
  3. Persson, Lars & Horn, Henrik, 1998. "Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets," Working Paper Series 513, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
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  6. Vasco Rodrigues, 1998. "ENDOGENOUS MERGERS and MARKET STRUCTURE," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 05, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
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  8. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
  9. Cramton, Peter C & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1990. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 17-47, February.
  10. Reitman, David, 1994. "Partial Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 313-22, September.
  11. Patricia Charlety & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2001. "Prises de participations et expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires," Working Papers 2001-42, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  12. Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel & Lopez-Cunat, Javier, 2001. "Delegation and mergers in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1263-1279, September.
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  14. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1993. "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, April.
  15. Levy, David T & Reitzes, James D, 1992. "Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 427-40, April.
  16. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
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