Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration
We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key variable. The possession of initial silent toeholds in rivals unambiguously encourages further partial acquisitions, both controlling and silent. However, a higher initial controlling share generally stimulates controlling acquisitions, but always discourages silent ones. Finally, indirect acquisitions through the controlled firm are always controlling and preferred when the targeted block is small.
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Volume (Year): 165 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- Malueg, David A., 1992.
"Collusive behavior and partial ownership of rivals,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 27-34, March.
- Malueg, D.A., 1990. "Collusive Behavior And Partial Ownership Of Rivals," Papers 90-9, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Patricia Charlety & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2001. "Prises de participations et expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires," Working Papers 2001-42, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
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