An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly
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- Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 24578, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_024, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Spiegel, Yossi, 2019. "The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the distribution of social surplus," CEPR Discussion Papers 13925, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johnson, Justin Pappas & Rhodes, Andrew, 2018. "Multiproduct Mergers and Quality Competition," TSE Working Papers 18-967, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
More about this item
KeywordsAggregative Game; Herfindahl index; Horizontal Merger; market power; Multiproduct Firms; Oligopoly Pricing;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2018-06-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2018-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2018-06-11 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2018-06-11 (Microeconomics)
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