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Multiproduct Pricing Made Simple

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  • Mark Armstrong
  • John Vickers

Abstract

We study multiproduct firms in the contexts of unregulated monopoly, regulated monopoly, and Cournot oligopoly. Using the concept of consumer surplus as a function of quantities (rather than prices), we present simple formulas for optimal prices and show that Cournot equilibrium exists and corresponds to a Ramsey optimum. We then discuss a tractable class of preferences that involve a generalized form of homotheticity. Profit-maximizing quantities are proportional to efficient quantities. We discuss optimal monopoly regulation when the firm has private information about its cost vector and find situations in which optimal regulation leaves relative price decisions to the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2018. "Multiproduct Pricing Made Simple," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1444-1471.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/697902
    DOI: 10.1086/697902
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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