Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking
Passage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed "every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade" and "monopolization" and treated violations as crimes. By these open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary power to draw lines between acceptable cooperation and illegal collusion, between vigorous competition and unlawful monopolization. By enlisting the courts to elaborate the Sherman Act' s broad commands, Congress gave economists a singular opportunity to shape competition policy. Because the statute' s vital terms directly implicated economic concepts, their interpretation inevitably would invite contributions from economists. What emerged is a convergence of economics and law without parallel in public oversight of business. As economic learning changed, the contours of antitrust doctrine and enforcement policy eventually would shift, as well. This article follows the evolution of thinking about competition since 1890 as reflected by major antitrust decisions and research in industrial organization. We divide the U.S. antitrust experience into five periods and discuss each period' s legal trends and economic thinking in three core areas of antitrust: cartels, cooperation, or other interactions among independent firms; abusive conduct by dominant firms; and mergers.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- George J. Stigler, 1980. "The Economist as Preacher," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 11, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Carl Shapiro, 1989. "The Theory of Business Strategy," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 125-137, Spring.
- Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier.
- George J. Stigler, 1947. "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55, pages 432-432.
- Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1971. "Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 306-322, September.
- Kovacic, William E, 1992. "The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 294-306, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0303006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.