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Wettbewerb und Regulierung

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  • Budzinski, Oliver
  • Eckert, Sandra

Abstract

Wettbewerb und Regulierung werfen sowohl aus einer wirtschafts- als auch aus einer politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektive interessante Fragestellungen auf und haben daher in beiden Disziplinen umfangreiche Beachtung gefunden. Während die Wirtschaftswissenschaften zwischen den Subdisziplinen Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsökonomik trennt, begreift die Politikwissenschaft die marktschaffende als auch marktkorrigierende 'regulative Politik' weitgehend als Einheit (Abschnitt 2). Der Hauptbeitrag der Wirtschaftswissenschaften liegt im Bereich einer wettbewerbsökonomischen Wirkungsanalyse (Abschnitt 3), während die politikwissenschaftliche Domäne in der Analyse von Institutionen und Prozessen der regulativen Politik zu verorten ist (Abschnitt 4). Aus einer interdisziplinären Perspektive kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis, dass beide Sichtweisen in erster Linie komplementär sind und sich gegenseitig befruchten können. Insbesondere das Verständnis jüngster Entwicklungen in den Bereichen Wettbewerb und Regulierung, die eine stärker industriepolitische und geostrategische Ausrichtung beinhalten, kann von einer politökonomischen Perspektive profitieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Budzinski, Oliver & Eckert, Sandra, 2023. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 183, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:280395
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wettbewerb; Regulierung; Wirtschaftswissenschaften; Politikwissenschaft; Wettbewerbspolitik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • A20 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • P40 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - General

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