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Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions matter!

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  • Budzinski, Oliver
  • Haucap, Justus

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert die Schnittstelle zwischen Recht und Ökonomik in der Wettbewerbspolitik. Aus einer ökonomischen Perspektive werden Ansätze zu einer institutionenökonomischen Analyse der Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung betrachtet. Im Rahmen einer positiven Institutionenökonomik der Wettbewerbspolitik analysieren die Autoren informationsökonomische Aspekte, verhaltensökonomische Ansätze, sowie die politökonomische Dimension. Zudem werden Bausteine einer normativen Institutionenökonomik des Kartellrechts diskutiert. Schließlich exploriert der Beitrag soziologische Aspekte der Wettbewerbspolitik, welche in der Literatur bisher weitgehend vernachlässigt werden. Insgesamt weisen die Autoren auf zahlreiche offene Fragen für das optimale Institutionendesign bei der Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung hin und identifizieren zahlreiche offene Forschungsfragen für die institutionenökonomische Wettbewerbsforschung.

Suggested Citation

  • Budzinski, Oliver & Haucap, Justus, 2019. "Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions matter!," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 102, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:diceop:102
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    Cited by:

    1. Budzinski, Oliver, 2021. "Wettbewerbsordnung und digitale Medienmärkte," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 153, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    2. Budzinski, Oliver & Haucap, Justus, 2019. "Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions matter!," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 102, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wettbewerbspolitik; Kartellrecht; Recht und Ökonomie; Institutionenökonomik; Ordnungsökonomik; Informationsökonomik; Verhaltensökonomik; Politische Ökonomik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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