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Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What can we Learn from the Industrial Organization Approach?

Author

Listed:
  • Patrice Bougette

    (Université Côte d'Azur
    GREDEG CNRS)

  • Oliver Budzinski

    (Technische Universität Ilmenau)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (Université Côte d'Azur, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

Abstract

This article conducts a detailed analysis of the concept of economic dependence and exploitative abuse based on how their treatment in competition law and economics and their enforcement in European case law have evolved. Although the theoretical roots of these concepts lie in economic theory, these issues have been ignored or considered only scantily in the context of competition law enforcement. An effects-based approach should take these problems into account and could provide insights into how to portray the impacts of these abuses. We draw on two examples – from the agri-food industries and the digital economy – of relevant economic dependence issues. This paper highlights the existence of a paradox: although industrial organization models provide relevant tools to characterize these abuses, assess their effects, and devise remedies, it seems that they are seldom used by competition law enforcers.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2017. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What can we Learn from the Industrial Organization Approach?," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-37, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Feb 2019.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2017-37
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    File URL: http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2017-37.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Budzinski & Victoriia Noskova & Xijie Zhang, 2019. "The brave new world of digital personal assistants: benefits and challenges from an economic perspective," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 177-194, December.
    2. Safieddine Bouali, 2020. "Covid-19 Pandemic and Abuse of Economic Dependence. Short-run Market Vulnerability and Exploitative conduct
      [Pandémie Covid-19 et abus de dépendance économique. Vulnérabilité du marché à court term
      ," Working Papers hal-02564678, HAL.
    3. Budzinski, Oliver, 2020. "The economics of international competition policy: New challenges in the light of digitization?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 135, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    4. Frédéric Marty, 2020. "Is the Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Law Perspective," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-13, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    5. Budzinski, Oliver & Gruésevaja, Marina & Noskova, Victoriia, 2020. "The economics of the German investigation of Facebook's data collection," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 139, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    exploitative abuse; abuse of economic dependence; competition law; European Commission; effects-based approach; digital economy;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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