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Old lady charm: explaining the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust

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  • Nicola Giocoli

Abstract

The paper deals with the mysterious persistence of the Chicago approach as the main analytical engine driving antitrust enforcement in American courts. While the approach has been almost completely replaced in contemporary industrial economics by the so-called Post-Chicago view, Chicago arguments still permeate antitrust case law at all judicial levels. Chicago's rise to dominance was allegedly due to the superiority of its economic analysis. Why did the Post-Chicago approach, which is supposed to have a clear analytical edge, fail to do the same? The paper offers a series of explanations: though none is completely exhaustive, each may account for a bit of the story. More generally, the current situation of antitrust case law offers valuable methodological insight on themes such as how economists persuade (i.e., how economic arguments come to be accepted and applied by policy- or law-makers) or the impact of the different professional practices in the diffusion of economic ideas.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Giocoli, 2015. "Old lady charm: explaining the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 96-122, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:22:y:2015:i:1:p:96-122
    DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2015.1005394
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicola Giocoli, 2013. "Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 271-330.
    2. Einer Elhauge, 2007. "Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
    3. Nicola Giocoli, 2011. "When low is no good: Predatory pricing and U.S. antitrust law (1950--1980)," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(5), pages 777-806, December.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    5. Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Competition vs. property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg School and the early years of European competition policy," MPRA Paper 33807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    7. Franklin M. Fisher, 1989. "Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 113-124, Spring.
    8. Bruce H. Kobayashi, 2010. "The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing," Chapters, in: Keith N. Hylton (ed.), Antitrust Law and Economics, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bougette, Patrice & Deschamps, Marc & Marty, Frã‰Dã‰Ric, 2015. "When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law," Enterprise & Society, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 313-353, June.
    2. Stephen Martin, 2015. "Areeda–Turner and the Treatment of Exclusionary Pricing under U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(3), pages 229-252, May.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1op860fg2l8f4p3acvk2hj0tmn is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "Exploitative Abuse and Abuse of Economic Dependence: What Can We Learn From an Industrial Organization Approach?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 129(2), pages 261-286.
    5. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "How Law and Economics Was Marketed in a Hostile World: the institutionalization of the field in the United States from the immediate post-war period to the Reagan years," Working Papers halshs-03124774, HAL.
    6. Signorino, Rodolfo, 2012. "Old lady charm: a comment," MPRA Paper 39211, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Wicksellian)
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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