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Old lady charm: a comment

  • Signorino, Rodolfo

I start from Nicola Giocoli’s acute rational reconstruction of current US antitrust debate which shows that there really is no shortage of plausible explanations to the Chicago persistent appeal puzzle. Each explanation, taken in isolation, is, at best, only partial. In my view, the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust owes much to the enduring grip of the equilibrium end-state notion of competition within top US Economics Departments and to the (alleged) resilience of market competition, absent entry/exit barriers, in the face of Type II Errors committed by antitrust Agencies.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39211.

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Date of creation: 04 Jun 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39211
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  1. Nicola Giocoli, 2014. "Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 271 - 330.
  2. Nicola Giocoli, 2015. "Old lady charm: explaining the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 96-122, March.
  3. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
  4. George J. Stigler, 1957. "Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 1.
  5. Gilbert, Richard J., 1988. "The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organization," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt01s8v4v3, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  6. Kaldor, Nicholas, 1972. "The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 82(328), pages 1237-55, December.
  7. Salvadori, Neri & Signorino, Rodolfo, 2011. "Competition," MPRA Paper 38387, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Samuelson, Paul A, 1978. "The Canonical Classical Model of Political Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 1415-34, December.
  9. Bailey, Elizabeth E, 1981. "Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 178-83, May.
  10. Reder, Melvin W, 1982. "Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-38, March.
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