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Old lady charm: a comment

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  • Signorino, Rodolfo

Abstract

I start from Nicola Giocoli’s acute rational reconstruction of current US antitrust debate which shows that there really is no shortage of plausible explanations to the Chicago persistent appeal puzzle. Each explanation, taken in isolation, is, at best, only partial. In my view, the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust owes much to the enduring grip of the equilibrium end-state notion of competition within top US Economics Departments and to the (alleged) resilience of market competition, absent entry/exit barriers, in the face of Type II Errors committed by antitrust Agencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Signorino, Rodolfo, 2012. "Old lady charm: a comment," MPRA Paper 39211, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39211
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gilbert, Richard J, 1989. "The Role of Potential Competition in Industrial Organization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 107-127, Summer.
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      • Salvadori, Neri & Signorino, Rodolfo, 2011. "Competition," MPRA Paper 38387, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Nicola Giocoli, 2013. "Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 271-330.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chicago school of law and economics; Type I and Type II Errors; entry barriers and horizontal merger regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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