When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law
We interrogate the legal and economic history to analyse the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyse the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2015|
|Publication status:||Published in Enterprise and Society, Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2015, 16 (2), pp.313-353|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01090048|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Einer Elhauge, 2007. "Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
- Nabila Arfaoui, 2014. "Eco-innovation and Regulatory Push/Pull Effect in the Case of REACH Regulation: Empirical Evidence from Survey Data," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-19, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, revised Dec 2015.
- Miscamble, Wilson D., 1982. "Thurman Arnold Goes to Washington: A Look at Antitrust Policy in the Later New Deal," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(01), pages 1-15, March.
- Nicola Giocoli, 2012. "Crossed destinies: law and economics meets the history of economic thought," History of Economic Ideas, Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa - Roma, vol. 20(3), pages 15-24.
- Nicola Giocoli, 2015.
"Old lady charm: explaining the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust,"
Journal of Economic Methodology,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 96-122, March.
- Giocoli, Nicola, 2012. "Old lady charm: explaining the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust," MPRA Paper 39244, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stephen Breyer, 2009. "Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(535), pages 123-135, February.
- DiLorenzo, Thomas J & High, Jack C, 1988. "Antitrust and Competition, Historically Considered," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(3), pages 423-435, July.
- Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Competition vs. property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg School and the early years of European competition policy," MPRA Paper 33807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrice Bougette & Frédéric Marty & Julien Pillot & Patrice Reis, 2012. "Exclusivity in High-Tech Industries: Evidence from the French Case," Post-Print halshs-00691836, HAL.
- Gressley, Gene M., 1964. "Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(02), pages 214-231, June.
- William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2000.
"Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
- Kovacic, William E. & Shapiro, Carl, 1999. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt5zb4g387, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Law and Economics 0303006, EconWPA.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01090048. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.