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Measuring The Deterrence Properties Of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy Indexes

Author

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  • Paolo Buccirossi
  • Lorenzo Ciari
  • Tomaso Duso
  • Giancarlo Spagnolo
  • Cristiana Vitale

Abstract

This article describes in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, the Competition Policy Indexes (CPIs). The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a jurisdiction's competition policy—where by competition policy, we mean the antitrust legislation including the merger control provisions and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime (particularly information on the legal framework, the institutional settings, and the enforcement tools of each jurisdiction that we examine) score against a benchmark of generally agreed-upon best practices and summarize them, so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons. We calculate the CPIs for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period from 1995 to 2005.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2011. "Measuring The Deterrence Properties Of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy Indexes," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 165-204.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:7:y:2011:i:1:p:165-204.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippon, Thomas & Gutierrez, German, 2018. "How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift," CEPR Discussion Papers 12983, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Golovanova, Svetlana & Ribeiro, Eduardo Pontual & Avdasheva, Svetlana, 2025. "Economic analysis and competition policy practice: A comparative empirical examination," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 49(1).
    3. Michael Böheim & Klaus Friesenbichler, 2014. "Does Accession to the European Union Foster Competition Policy? Country-level Evidence," WIFO Working Papers 491, WIFO.
    4. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Empirische Ex-Post Evaluation von wettbewerbspolitischen Entscheidungen: Methodische Anmerkungen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 69, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    5. Shen, Zhe & Sowah, Joseph Sowahfio & Dak-Adzaklo, Cephas Simon Peter & Li, Shan, 2023. "Competition laws and corporate risk-taking around the world," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    6. Klaus Friesenbichler, 2014. "EU Accession, Domestic Market Competition and Total Factor Productivity. Firm Level Evidence," WIFO Working Papers 492, WIFO.
    7. Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2013. "Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 1324-1336, October.
    8. Klaus Friesenbichler & Michael Böheim & Michael Peneder, 2019. "Die Effekte der EU-Osterweiterung in den Beitrittsländern. Evidenz auf Länder- und auf Unternehmensebene," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 92(12), pages 907-918, December.
    9. Wifo, 2019. "WIFO-Monatsberichte, Heft 12/2019," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 92(12), December.
    10. Budzinski, Oliver & Haucap, Justus, 2019. "Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions Matter!," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 129, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    11. Michael H. Böheim & Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2016. "Exporting the Competition Policy Regime of the European Union: Success or Failure? Empirical Evidence for Acceding Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 569-582, May.
    12. Konstantin A. Kholodilin & Linus Pfeiffer, 2021. "Measuring Unmeasurable: How to Map Laws to Numbers Using Leximetrics," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1933, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    13. Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2020. "Does EU-accession affect domestic market structures and firm level productivity?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 343-364, May.
    14. Khemla Prishnee Armoogum & Stephen Davies & Franco Mariuzzo, 2017. "Cartel enforcement and deterrence over the life of a Competition Authority," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2017-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    15. World Bank Group, 2016. "Competition in the GCC SME Lending Markets," World Bank Publications - Reports 25404, The World Bank Group.
    16. Jala Youssef & Chahir Zaki, 2019. "A Decade of Competition Policy in Arab Countries: A De jure and De facto Assessment," Working Papers 1301, Economic Research Forum, revised 2019.
    17. Stöhr, Annika & Budzinski, Oliver, 2019. "Ex-post Analyse der Ministererlaubnis-Fälle - Gemeinwohl durch Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 124, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    18. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Impact evaluation of merger control decisions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 75, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    19. Barbara Baarsma & Ron Kemp & Rob Noll & Jo Seldeslachts, 2012. "Let’s Not Stick Together: Anticipation of Cartel and Merger Control in The Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 357-376, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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