IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/tuiedp/124.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ex-post Analyse der Ministererlaubnis-Fälle - Gemeinwohl durch Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen?

Author

Listed:
  • Stöhr, Annika
  • Budzinski, Oliver

Abstract

Die sogenannte Ministererlaubnis als Teil der deutschen Fusionskontrolle repräsentiert wahrscheinlich das umstrittenste Instrument sowohl in der juristischen als auch in der ökonomischen Fachdiskussion. Vereinfachend ausgedrückt ermöglicht die Ministererlaubnis dem Bundeswirtschaftsminister, ein Zusammenschlussverbot des Bundeskartellamtes aufgrund von erwarteten positiven Gemeinwohleffekten aufzuheben. Zu den Kritikpunkten zählt dabei, dass die tatsächlichen Erlaubnisentscheidungen weniger durch Gemeinwohlerwägungen zu begründen seien als vielmehr durch politökonomische Interessen bzw. erfolgreiche Lobbyaktivitäten. Zwar können wir im vorliegenden Beitrag nicht die tatsächlichen Motivationen der Erlaubnisentscheidungen nachweisen, aber wir können mit Hilfe von Ex-Post-Analysen zeigen, dass sich nur in einem geringen Teil der Erlaubnisfälle die Gründe, welche zur Erlaubnis führten, ex-post empirisch bestätigt haben und auch auf die Fusion zurückzuführen sind. Damit kann die Ministererlaubnis in ihrer gegenwärtigen Form nicht als effektives Instrument einer gemeinwohlorientierten Korrektur von Fusionskontrollentscheidungen eingestuft werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Stöhr, Annika & Budzinski, Oliver, 2019. "Ex-post Analyse der Ministererlaubnis-Fälle - Gemeinwohl durch Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 124, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:124
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/196586/1/1663769478.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2011. "Measuring The Deterrence Properties Of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy Indexes," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 165-204.
    2. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Empirische Ex-Post Evaluation von wettbewerbspolitischen Entscheidungen: Methodische Anmerkungen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 69, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    3. Damien Neven & Hans Zenger, 2008. "Ex Post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 477-490, December.
    4. Maennig, Wolfgang & Hölzer, Katharina, 1999. "Zur aktuellen deutschen Förderung der Airbus-Industrie," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 79(3), pages 191-200.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Budzinski, Oliver & Stöhr, Annika, 2019. "Public interest considerations in European merger control regimes," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 130, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Impact evaluation of merger control decisions," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 75, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    2. Haji Ali Beigi, Maryam & Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "On the use of event studies to evaluate economic policy decisions: A note of caution," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 80, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    3. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Empirische Ex-Post Evaluation von wettbewerbspolitischen Entscheidungen: Methodische Anmerkungen," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 69, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    4. N. N., 2019. "WIFO-Monatsberichte, Heft 12/2019," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 92(12), December.
    5. Stefan Gössling & Frank Fichert & Peter Forsyth, 2017. "Subsidies in Aviation," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(8), pages 1-19, July.
    6. Michael H. Böheim & Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2016. "Exporting the Competition Policy Regime of the European Union: Success or Failure? Empirical Evidence for Acceding Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 569-582, May.
    7. Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2013. "Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 1324-1336, October.
    8. Budzinski, Oliver, 2012. "Würde eine unabhängige europäische Wettbewerbsbehörde eine bessere Wettbewerbspolitik machen?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 78, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    9. Klaus S. Friesenbichler & Michael Böheim & Michael Peneder, 2019. "Die Effekte der EU-Osterweiterung in den Beitrittsländern. Evidenz auf Länder- und auf Unternehmensebene," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 92(12), pages 907-918, December.
    10. Sunel Grimbeek & Steve Koch & Richard Grimbeek, 2013. "The Consistency of Merger Decisions at the South African Competition Commission," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 81(4), pages 561-580, December.
    11. Oliver Budzinski, 2011. "Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions," Working Papers 112/11, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    12. Khemla Prishnee Armoogum & Stephen Davies & Franco Mariuzzo, 2017. "Cartel enforcement and deterrence over the life of a Competition Authority," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2017-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    13. Gutierrez, German & Philippon, Thomas, 2018. "How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift," CEPR Discussion Papers 12983, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2020. "Does EU-accession affect domestic market structures and firm level productivity?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 343-364, May.
    15. Budzinski, Oliver & Haucap, Justus, 2019. "Kartellrecht und Ökonomik: Institutions matter!," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 102, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    16. John Davies, 2018. "‘Outcome’ Assessment: What Exactly Are We Measuring? A Personal Reflection on Measuring the Outcomes from Competition Agencies’ Interventions," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 7-22, March.
    17. Richard J. Grimbeek & Sunel Grimbeek & Steven F. Koch, 2011. "The Consistency of Merger Decisions in a Developing Country: The South African Competition Commission," Working Papers 201117, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
    18. Robert Breunig & Flavio M. Menezes & Kelvin Jui Keng Tan, 2012. "An Empirical Investigation of the Mergers Decision Process in Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(283), pages 459-475, December.
    19. Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Schnabel, Isabel & Truger, Achim & Wieland, Volker, 2019. "Den Strukturwandel meistern. Jahresgutachten 2019/20," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201920, September.
    20. Jala Youssef & Chahir Zaki, 2019. "A Decade of Competition Policy in Arab Countries: A De jure and De facto Assessment," Working Papers 1301, Economic Research Forum, revised 2019.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ministererlaubnis; Wettbewerbspolitik; Zusammenschlusskontrolle; Mergers & Acquisitions; Wettbewerbsökonomik; Antitrust; Ex-Post-Analysen; Recht & Ökonomik; Fusionskontrolle; Wettbewerbsordnung; Wirtschaftspolitik;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ivtuide.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.