Let’s Not Stick Together: Anticipation of Cartel and Merger Control in The Netherlands
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- Clougherty, Joseph A. & Duso, Tomaso & Lee, Miyu & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2016.
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More about this item
KeywordsCompetition enforcement; Deterrence; Cartel prohibition; Merger control; K21; K42; L40;
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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