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Assessing The Effects Of A Road-Surfacing Cartel In Switzerland

Author

Listed:
  • Kai Hüschelrath
  • Nina Leheyda
  • Patrick Beschorner

Abstract

The paper assesses the impact of the detection of a hard-core cartel in the Swiss market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an investigation of supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also derives estimates of the economic effects of the Swiss Competition Commission's decision in the road-surfacing cartel case. The results indicate that the detection of the cartel may have led to short-term price reductions; however, the persistent collusion-friendly industry structure forecloses larger and durable gains for the customers.

Suggested Citation

  • Kai Hüschelrath & Nina Leheyda & Patrick Beschorner, 2010. "Assessing The Effects Of A Road-Surfacing Cartel In Switzerland," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 335-374.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:6:y:2010:i:2:p:335-374.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhp018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro & José Luis Torres, 2014. "Price Hysteresis After Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence From Spanish Food Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 217-256.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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