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The deterrent effect of Russian control of mergers: An Empirical Study

Author

Listed:
  • Redkina, Anastasia

    () (NRU HSE)

  • Lagodyuk, Ekaterina

    () (NRU HSE)

Abstract

The article is devoted to identifying the deterrent effect of Russian control of mergers. Under the deterrent effect it meant a decrease of future M & A activity in connection with the strengthening of the regulatory impact of the antimonopoly body. To conduct the study were used panel data of two types: on the number of permits corrective prescriptions and prohibitions on the merger by sector for the years 2009-2014 in Russia, the economic characteristics of industries. A model showing the relationship between the amount received bans and regulations and M & A activity in the next period. The results of this study confirm the existence of a deterrent effect in the Russian merger control. At the same time permission to the regulations do not have a deterrent effect on future M & A activity, and restrictions may constrain the number of submitted applications. The study of the deterrent effect will allow a more accurate assessment of the overall benefits of the merger of Russian control since the deterrent effect of the merger is greater than the direct effect of regulations and prohibitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Redkina, Anastasia & Lagodyuk, Ekaterina, 2016. "The deterrent effect of Russian control of mergers: An Empirical Study," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 79-104, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1609
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust policy; merger control; the deterrent effect;

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L49 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Other
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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