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The deterrent effect of Russian control of mergers: An Empirical Study

Listed author(s):
  • Redkina, Anastasia

    ()

    (NRU HSE)

  • Lagodyuk, Ekaterina

    ()

    (NRU HSE)

The article is devoted to identifying the deterrent effect of Russian control of mergers. Under the deterrent effect it meant a decrease of future M & A activity in connection with the strengthening of the regulatory impact of the antimonopoly body. To conduct the study were used panel data of two types: on the number of permits corrective prescriptions and prohibitions on the merger by sector for the years 2009-2014 in Russia, the economic characteristics of industries. A model showing the relationship between the amount received bans and regulations and M & A activity in the next period. The results of this study confirm the existence of a deterrent effect in the Russian merger control. At the same time permission to the regulations do not have a deterrent effect on future M & A activity, and restrictions may constrain the number of submitted applications. The study of the deterrent effect will allow a more accurate assessment of the overall benefits of the merger of Russian control since the deterrent effect of the merger is greater than the direct effect of regulations and prohibitions.

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File URL: ftp://w82.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/ep1609.pdf
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Article provided by Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in its journal Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 1 (2016)
Issue (Month): (February)
Pages: 79-104

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Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1609
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