IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies


  • Paul L. Joskow


This article discusses the application of transaction cost economics (TCE) to the specification of antitrust legal rules and antitrust remedies and explains why the application of TCE analysis may lead to very different legal rules and remedies from approaches that ignore TCE considerations. Antitrust legal rules must be sensitive to the attributes of the institutions we rely upon to enforce antitrust policies, the information and analytical capabilities these institutions possess, the uncertainties they must confront in the diagnosis and mitigation of anticompetitive behavior and market structures, and the associated costs of type I and type II errors implied by alternative legal rules and remedies. Modern imperfect competition theory that fails to take TCE principles into account is likely to lead to poor legal rules and remedies. These conclusions are supported by a discussion of the Kodak case and its progeny and of the proposed divestiture remedies approved by the District Court's decision in the Microsoft case. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul L. Joskow, 2002. "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 95-116, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:95-116

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:95-116. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.