Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence
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- Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 2005. "Does antitrust policy improve consumer welfare? Assessing the evidence," Chapters,in: Governments, Competition and Utility Regulation, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
References listed on IDEAS
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