IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/erg/wpaper/1301.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Decade of Competition Policy in Arab Countries: A De jure and De facto Assessment

Author

Listed:
  • Jala Youssef

    (World Bank)

  • Chahir Zaki

Abstract

Despite its several benefits, competition policy seems to lack the attention it deserves in terms of public interest and in terms of research in Arab countries. In the 1990s, many of them started to adopt economic reform programs that were broadly market packages aiming at reducing the role of the state, whereas competition laws mostly appeared in the following wave of reforms in the 2000s. However, the adoption of law does not seem to be sufficient in its own and what really matters is its implementation and enforcement. To date, many Arab countries have at least ten years of experience in competition policy, which we believe is a sufficient and suitable experience for assessment. However, to our knowledge, there are no cross countries studies assessing the market outcomes of competition policy in this group of countries. Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is twofold. First, the paper aims at assessing competition policy in Arab countries in terms of rules (de jure) and implementation (de facto). For both the rules and implementation, we construct indices assessing three categories: enforcement, advocacy and institutional effectiveness. Second, the paper analyses the association between competition policy rules (de jure) and implementation (de facto) and competition outcomes (factual-based and perception-based). This correlation exercise uses our own created indices and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys data (WBES). Our main findings show that, in general, the overall assessment of our group of Arab countries competition legislations seems to be broadly average. In particular, Egypt and Tunisia had better scores in their implementation index for 2012 compared to their corresponding rules index, while it is the inverse in the Jordanian and Moroccan cases. Moreover, the Djiboutian and the Yemeni legislations are the weakest among the group. As per factual based competition outcomes, our competition indices are in general negatively correlated with market power, pointing out the importance of the deterrence effect that competition policy can play in limiting market power. In addition, on the perception-based outcomes front, our indices are mostly positively associated with perceiving more competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Jala Youssef & Chahir Zaki, 2019. "A Decade of Competition Policy in Arab Countries: A De jure and De facto Assessment," Working Papers 1301, Economic Research Forum, revised 2019.
  • Handle: RePEc:erg:wpaper:1301
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/1301.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://bit.ly/2KtUupT
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wendy Carlin & Steven Fries & Mark Schaffer & Paul Seabright, 2001. "Competition and Enterprise Performance in Transition Economies from a Cross-Country Survey," CERT Discussion Papers 0101, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Peter Murrell, 2002. "Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 739-792, September.
    3. Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2013. "Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(4), pages 1324-1336, October.
    4. Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2011. "Measuring The Deterrence Properties Of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy Indexes," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 165-204.
    5. Nesreen Barakat, 2012. "Arab Passengers’ Airlines Framework and Performance: Jordan Case," Working Papers 727, Economic Research Forum, revised 2012.
    6. Sam Hakim & Simon Neaime, 2011. "An Analysis of the Mobile Telephone Sector in MENA: Potential for Deregulation and Privatization," Working Papers 649, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 Jan 2011.
    7. Enrico Alemani & Caroline Klein & Isabell Koske & Cristiana Vitale & Isabelle Wanner, 2013. "New Indicators of Competition Law and Policy in 2013 for OECD and non-OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1104, OECD Publishing.
    8. Stefan Voigt, 2009. "The Effects of Competition Policy on Development - Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(8), pages 1225-1248.
    9. Klaus S. Friesenbichler & Michael Böheim & Daphne Channa Laster, 2014. "Market Competition in Transition Economies: A Literature Review," WIFO Working Papers 477, WIFO.
    10. Carlin, Wendy & Fries, Steven & Schaffer, Mark & Seabright, Paul, 2001. "Competition and Enterprise Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from a Cross-country Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 2840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Brahim Morchid & Khalid Sekkat, 2012. "Moroccan Passenger Airlines Framework and Performance," Working Papers 725, Economic Research Forum, revised 2012.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jala Youssef & Chahir Zaki, 2019. "Between Stabilization and Allocation in the MENA Region: Are Competition Laws Helping?," Working Papers 1319, Economic Research Forum, revised 21 Aug 2019.
    2. Philippon, Thomas & Gutierrez, German, 2018. "How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift," CEPR Discussion Papers 12983, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Ichiro IWASAKI & Satoshi MIZOBATA, 2018. "Post-Privatization Ownership And Firm Performance: A Large Meta-Analysis Of The Transition Literature," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(2), pages 263-322, June.
    4. Jan Hanousek & Ev??en Ko?enda & Jan Svejnar, 2004. "Ownership, Control and Corporate Performance After Large-Scale Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-652, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    5. Michael H. Böheim & Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2016. "Exporting the Competition Policy Regime of the European Union: Success or Failure? Empirical Evidence for Acceding Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 569-582, May.
    6. Carlin Wendy & Schaffer Mark & Seabright Paul, 2004. "A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-45, September.
    7. Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2014. "EU Accession, Domestic Market Competition and Total Factor Productivity. Firm Level Evidence," WIFO Working Papers 492, WIFO.
    8. Kornai, János & Maskin, Eric & Roland, Gérard, 2022. "A puha költségvetési korlát - II [The soft budget constraint II]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 94-132.
    9. Janos Kollő & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2005. "Wage Bargaining, Privatisation, Ability to Pay and Outside Options: Evidence from Hungary," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 465-483.
    10. L??szl?? Halpern & G??bor K??r??si, 2003. "Corporate performance and market structure during transition in Hungary," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-606, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    11. Leppänen, Simo & Linden, Mikael & Solanko, Laura, 2009. "Firm behavior under production uncertainty : Evidence from Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/2009, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    12. Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda & Jan Svejnar, 2007. "Origin and concentration," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 15(1), pages 1-31, January.
    13. Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2020. "Does EU-accession affect domestic market structures and firm level productivity?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 343-364, May.
    14. Ramstetter, Eric D. & Ngoc, Phan Minh, 2013. "Productivity, ownership, and producer concentration in transition: Further evidence from Vietnamese manufacturing," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 28-42.
    15. Zorica Kalezić, 2015. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from Montenegro," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 4(3), pages 5-64.
    16. J??r??me Sgard, 2001. "Direct Foreign Investments And Productivity Growth In Hungarian Firms, 1992-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 425, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    17. Michael Böheim & Klaus S. Friesenbichler, 2014. "Does Accession to the European Union Foster Competition Policy? Country-level Evidence," WIFO Working Papers 491, WIFO.
    18. Jan Svejnar & Evzen Kocenda, 2002. "The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm Performance after Large-Scale Privatization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 471, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    19. Daniele Girardi & Roberto Veneziani & Susanne Wengle, 2023. "Great expectations: a tale of two transitions," Working Papers 968, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    20. Koman, Matjaž & Laki?evi?, Milan & Prašnikar, Janez & Svejnar, Jan, 2013. "Asset Stripping, Rule of Law and Firm Survival: The Hoff-Stiglitz Model and Mass Privatization in Montenegro," IZA Discussion Papers 7821, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erg:wpaper:1301. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sherine Ghoneim (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/erfaceg.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.