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Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale

Author

Listed:
  • Patrice Bougette

    (UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Oliver Budzinski

    (TU - Technische Universität Ilmenau)

  • Frédéric Marty

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

Abstract

This paper explores the evolving landscape of competition law enforcement, focusing on the dynamic interplay between ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Amidst the digital transformation and regulatory shifts, traditional enforcement mechanisms are being re-evaluated. This study aims to dissect the economic rationale behind these shifts, proposing a hybrid framework that balances legal certainty with the flexibility needed to address contemporary market challenges.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Bougette & Oliver Budzinski & Frédéric Marty, 2024. "Ex-ante versus Ex-post in Competition Law Enforcement: Blurred Boundaries and Economic Rationale," Working Papers halshs-04604840, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-04604840
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition Law Enforcement; Ex-ante and Ex-post Approaches; Anticompetitive Practices; Merger Control; Digital Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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