On the Design of Leniency Programs
Leniency programs contribute to destabilizing collusion but can also be abused and generate perverse effects. This paper develops a simple model capturing this trade-off, which we use to relate the optimal leniency policy (the carrot) to the effectiveness of investigations (the stick). We show that it is always desirable to offer some leniency before an investigation is launched; it is also optimal to offer some leniency once an investigation is underway when investigations are unlikely to succeed in uncovering cartels, absent self-reporting. Our analysis also confirms the usefulness of restricting leniency to the first informant only; in contrast, it does not support prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Apr 2007|
|Date of revision:||Jan 2012|
|Publication status:||Published in The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 56, n. 4, November 2013, p. 917-957.|
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- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003.
"Leniency programs and cartel prosecution,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Motta, M. & Polo, M., 1999. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute.
- Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, . "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working Papers 150, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Frezal, Sylvestre, 2006. "On optimal cartel deterrence policies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1231-1240, November.
- Cécile Aubert, 2005.
"The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-blowing Programs on Cartels,"
- Aubert, Cecile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1241-1266, November.
- Cécile Aubert, 2005. "The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-blowing Programs on Cartels," Post-Print hal-00278558, HAL.
- Cécile Aubert & Patrick Rey & William Kovacic, 2006. "The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-blowing Programs on Cartels," Post-Print hal-00151654, HAL.
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