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Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs

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  • Jeroen Hinloopen
  • Adriaan R. Soetevent

Abstract

The number of cartels detected in the United States and in Europe has increased considerably since the introduction of corporate leniency programs in antitrust legislation. It cannot, however, be ruled out that this apparent success results in part from increased cartel activity. We explore the effects of corporate leniency programs on pricing and cartel activity by use of an experiment. We find that in the lab (i) fewer cartels are established when a leniency program is in place, and (ii) cartels that do exist are less successful in charging prices above the static Nash equilibrium price and have lower survival rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeroen Hinloopen & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2008. "Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 607-616, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:607-616
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00030.x
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