Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers
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More about this item
Keywordsamnesty; antitrust; cartels; collusion; corporate crime; debt; deterrence; extended liability; fines; immunity; imprisonment; judgement proofness; law enforcement; leniency; optimal fines; optimal liability; optimal sanctions; organized crime; political economy; rewards; sunk cost bias; whistleblowers;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-01-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-FIN-2006-01-29 (Finance)
- NEP-LAW-2006-01-29 (Law & Economics)
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