Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance As Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Yeon‐Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008.
"Strategic judgment proofing,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 926-948, December.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2006. "Strategic Judgment Proofing," MPRA Paper 6100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Strategic Judgment Proofing," NBER Working Papers 14183, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James A. Brickley & Susan F. Lu & Gerard J. Wedig, 2022. "Are firms with ‘deep pockets’ more responsive to tort liability? Evidence from nursing homes," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(8), pages 1590-1617, August.
- Sara Aghakazemjourabbaf & Margaret Insley, 2018. "Optimal timing of harzardous waste clean-up under an environmental bond an a strict liability rule," Working Papers 1803, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised 06 Jan 2018.
- Francisco Ramos Romeu, 2010. "An economic theory of the regulation of preliminary measures," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 267-300, December.
- Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & De Geest, Gerrit, 2006.
"When will judgment proof injurers take too much precaution?,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 336-354, September.
- Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, "undated". "When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1051, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- G. Dari Mattiacci & G.G.A. de Geest, 2004. "When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?," Working Papers 04-27, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Buccirossi, Paolo, 2006. "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003. "Optimal negligence rule under limited liability," Economics Working Papers 759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2004.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IAS-2004-03-07 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2004-03-07 (Law and Economics)
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