Fines, Leniency, Rewards and Organized Crime: Evidence from Antitrust Experiments
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sauvagnat, Julien, 2010. "Prosecution and Leniency Programs: a Fool's Game," TSE Working Papers 10-188, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Jana Krajcova & Andreas Ortmann, 2008. "Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of “Natural” Framing," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp372, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl, 2010. "Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(4), pages 573-590, December.
- Jana Krajcova, 2008. "Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of Change in Parameterization," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp370, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
More about this item
KeywordsAnti-trust; Collusion; Experiment; Leniency;
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-04-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2008-04-15 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2008-04-15 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2008-04-15 (Regulation)
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