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The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement

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  • Jun Zhou

Abstract

Highlights The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market...

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  • Jun Zhou, 2016. "The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement," Working Papers 13042, Bruegel.
    • Handle: RePEc:bre:wpaper:13042
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    Cited by:

    1. Heim, Sven & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Spiegel, Yossi, 2017. "Minority share acquisitions and collusion: Evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-037, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Jochem, Annabelle & Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Valletta, Giacomo, 2020. "The impact of the 2002 reform of the EU leniency program on cartel outcomes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).

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