Analysis of Cartel Duration: Evidence from EC Prosecuted Cartels
This study first analyses the life span of the cartels convicted by the European Commission during 1990-2008 and explores certain issues regarding the empirical definition of cartel duration. The cross-section analysis then investigates the determinants of cartel break up using a competing risk Cox proportional hazard model. The result shows that external disturbances and changes in the cartels' own structures play a crucial role in cartel demise. Moreover, the cartel members' ability to enforce their agreement through better organization also dictates its success. The analysis also reveals that when a leniency regime is in operation, cartels tend to be more fragile.
Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CIJB20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CIJB20|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:33-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.