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Self-disclosure at international cartels

Author

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  • Steffen Brenner

    (Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark)

Abstract

We study revelation behavior at illegal international cartels. Our hypotheses suggest that a resource advantage induces executives of large multinational enterprises (MNEs) to be more likely to reveal the cartel and to cooperate with the antitrust agency during the prosecution stage. Moreover, we expect the cultural background to influence the firm's inclination to reveal incriminating evidence. Empirical tests based on data about cartel breakdowns under the EU Leniency Program show that large MNEs are indeed more likely to reveal the cartel. However, they largely fail to explain variation in legal actions along cultural dimensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Brenner, 2011. "Self-disclosure at international cartels," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 42(2), pages 221-234, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jintbs:v:42:y:2011:i:2:p:221-234
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2017. "EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust: a comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 91-112, August.
    2. Marvao, Catarina, 2014. "Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information," SITE Working Paper Series 29, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    3. Houba Harold & Motchenkova Evgenia & Wen Quan, 2015. "The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 351-389, July.
    4. Brian C Pinkham & Mike W Peng, 2017. "Overcoming institutional voids via arbitration," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 48(3), pages 344-359, April.
    5. Jun Zhou, 2016. "The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement," Working Papers 13042, Bruegel.
    6. Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Juan Luis Jiménez & Manuel Ojeda-Cabral & José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, 2023. "Who Blows the Whistle on Cartels? Finding the Leniency Applicant at the European Commission," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 123-153, September.
    8. Marvão, Catarina, 2014. "Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:1, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
    9. Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro & Dieleman, Marleen & Hirsch, Paul & Rodrigues, Suzana B. & Zyglidopoulos, Stelios, 2021. "Multinationals’ misbehavior," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5).
    10. Hoang, Cung Truong & Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Smuda, Florian, 2014. "Determinants of self-reporting under the European corporate leniency program," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 15-23.

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