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EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust: a comparative analysis


  • Dzmitry Bartalevich

    () (University of Aarhus)


Abstract The article provides a critical overview of the most important elements of EU competition policy reforms and presents a comparative analysis between EU and U.S. competition policies. The main focus is on the analysis of cartel enforcement policy, monopoly policy, and merger control.

Suggested Citation

  • Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2017. "EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust: a comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 91-112, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:44:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-014-9459-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-014-9459-7

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Helder Vasconcelos, 2010. "Efficiency Gains And Structural Remedies In Merger Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 742-766, December.
    2. Steffen Brenner, 2011. "Self-disclosure at international cartels," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 42(2), pages 221-234, February.
    3. Oliver Budzinski, 2010. "An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger Control," Working Papers 101/10, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    4. Thomas D. Zweifel, 2003. "Democratic Deficits in Comparison: Best (and Worst) Practices in European, US and Swiss Merger Regulation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 541-566, June.
    5. Bruce R. Lyons, 2004. "Reform of European Merger Policy," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 246-261, May.
    6. Angela Wigger & Andreas Nölke, 2007. "Enhanced Roles of Private Actors in EU Business Regulation and the Erosion of Rhenish Capitalism: the Case of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45, pages 487-513, June.
    7. Budzinski Oliver & Kuchinke Björn A., 2012. "Deal or No Deal? Consensual Arrangements as an Instrument of European Competition Policy," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 63(3), pages 265-292, December.
    8. Matthieu Montalban & Sigfrido Ramïrez-Përez, 2011. "EU Competition policy revisited: Economic Doctrines within european political work," Post-Print hal-00651720, HAL.
    9. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "Monoculture versus diversity in competition economics," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 295-324, March.
    10. Morgan, Eleanor J., 2009. "Controlling cartels - Implications of the EU policy reforms," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-12, February.
    11. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Christian Wey, 2003. "Merger Control in the New Economy," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 5-20, May.
    12. Karine Brisset & Lionel Thomas, 2004. "Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 5-19, January.
    13. Loss, Frederic & Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle & Verge, Thibaud & Berges-Sennou, Fabian, 2008. "European competition policy modernization: From notifications to legal exception," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 77-98, January.
    14. Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Andt, 2005. "Competence Allocation in the EU Competition Policy System as an Interest-Driven Process," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 313-337, December.
    15. John Vickers, 2005. "Abuse of Market Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(504), pages 244-261, June.
    16. Leigh Davison & Debra Johnson, 2002. "The EU's evolving stance on the international dimension of competition policy: A critical commentary," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 37(5), pages 244-252, September.
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    More about this item


    EU competition policy; U.S. antitrust; Cartel policy; Monopoly policy; Merger control;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law


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