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EU Competition policy revisited: Economic Doctrines within european political work

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  • Matthieu Montalban

    (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Sigfrido Ramïrez-Përez

Abstract

European Union competition policy is often described as neoliberal, without this leading to more investigation. This paper highlights how the European Competition policy doctrine has been shaped, how the ordoliberal movement and the Chicago school ideas have been implemented and supported by the political work of some key actors. We show that, contrary to what is sometimes said in literature, ordoliberal actors were neither hegemonic nor leaders between Rome Treaty and the eighties, even if some neoliberal principles were introduced in antitrust law. These laws are much more a compromise between French and German representatives, and between neo-mercantilists and ordoliberals. However, things have dramatically changed since the eighties, when both (1) new political work from members of the Commission introduced in the European competition policy elements of Chicago School doctrine to complete the European market and (2) some decisions from the ECJ clarified the doctrine of EU Competition law. Nowadays, European competition policy is a mix between an ordoliberal spirit and some Chicago School doctrinal elements.
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Suggested Citation

  • Matthieu Montalban & Sigfrido Ramïrez-Përez, 2011. "EU Competition policy revisited: Economic Doctrines within european political work," Post-Print hal-00651720, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00651720
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2017. "EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust: a comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 91-112, August.
    2. Laurent Warlouzet, 2016. "The Centralization of EU Competition Policy: Historical Institutionalist Dynamics from Cartel Monitoring to Merger Control (1956–91)," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 725-741, May.
    3. Arnaud Lechevalier, 2015. "Eucken under the Pillow: The Ordoliberal Imprint on Social Europe," Post-Print halshs-03781875, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

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