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Democratic Deficits in Comparison: Best (and Worst) Practices in European, US and Swiss Merger Regulation

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  • Thomas D. Zweifel

Abstract

Policy‐makers and scholars continue to express concerns that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. But most democratic deficit arguments are not based on recent empirical research; and seeing the EU as sui generis, they fail to compare the EU to other polities. This article compares the European ‘regulatory state’ with two federal democracies, the United States and Switzerland, in recent merger regulation. Its main finding is that European merger regulation is less democratic than American, but more democratic than Swiss regulation. If the EU suffers from a democratic deficit, it is hardly alone.

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  • Thomas D. Zweifel, 2003. "Democratic Deficits in Comparison: Best (and Worst) Practices in European, US and Swiss Merger Regulation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 541-566, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:41:y:2003:i:3:p:541-566
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00434
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    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pier Domenico Tortola, 2014. "The Limits of Normalization: Taking Stock of the EU-US Comparative Literature," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(6), pages 1342-1357, November.
    2. Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2017. "EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust: a comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 91-112, August.

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