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"Incohérence temporelle" de la politique monétaire optimale. Un argument en faveur des zones cibles

  • Daniel Laskar

[eng] The paper considers the problem faced by a central bank which wants to sta­bilize both the exchange rate and the interest rate. In the absence of commitment the equilibrium policy (the "time consistent policy") is not optimal. It is shown that a commitment to an exchange-rate target zone system may be beneficial for two reasons. First, by stabilizing the exchange rate this makes the solution closer to a commitment to the optimal linear stationary rule. Second, through the "honey­moon effect" a commitment to a target zone shares some additional property with the optimal policy under commitment. [fre] Le texte considère le problème que doit résoudre une Banque centrale qui veut stabiliser à la fois le taux de change et le taux d'intérêt. En l'absence de pos­sibilité d'engagement, la politique d'équilibre (la politique « temporellement cohé­rente ») n'est pas optimale. On montre que s'engager à maintenir le taux de change à l'intérieur d'une zone cible peut être bénéfique pour deux raisons. En premier lieu, parce que stabiliser le taux de change permet de se rapprocher de la solution linéaire stationnaire optimale. En second lieu, à travers l'effet de « lune de miel » une zone cible possède une propriété additionnelle commune avec la poli­tique qui est optimale lorsqu'il est possible de s'engager sur la politique future.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 48 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 5-22

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1997_num_48_1_409861
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1997.409861
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