Exchange Rate Bands and Optimal Monetary Accommodation Under a Dirty Float
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- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & van der Ploeg, F., 1992. "Exchange rate bands and optimal monetary accomodation under a dirty float," Discussion Paper 1992-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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More about this item
KeywordsBrownian Motion; Dirty Floating; Exchange Rate Regimes; PPP Exchange Rate Rules; Stochastic Simulation; Supply Shocks;
- E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
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