Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.08.019
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- Bilbiie, Florin O., 2014. "Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 63-78.
- Bilbiie, Florin, 2009. "Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," CEPR Discussion Papers 7482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Florin Bilbiie, 2014. "Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia," Post-Print hal-01162224, HAL.
- Florin Bilbiie, 2014. "Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01162224, HAL.
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- Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2018. "Online Appendix to "Gradualism and Liquidity Traps"," Online Appendices 17-251, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Kohei Hasui & Teruyoshi Kobayashi & Tomohiro Sugo, 2019. "Irreversible monetary policy at the zero lower bound," Discussion Papers 1906, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
- Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt & Paul Yoo, 2018.
"Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps,"
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- Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt & Paul Yoo, 2020. "Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps," CARF F-Series CARF-F-480, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian & Yoo, Paul, 2018. "Speed limit policy and liquidity traps," Working Paper Series 2192, European Central Bank.
- Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt & Paul Yoo, 2018. "Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-050, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Marest, Luc & Thurston, Thom, 2018. "Measuring the value of central bank commitment in the benchmark New Keynesian model," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 249-265.
- Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2019.
"Gradualism and Liquidity Traps,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 182-199, January.
- Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt, 2016. "Gradualism and Liquidity Traps," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-092, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Schmidt, Sebastian & Nakata, Taisuke, 2016. "Gradualism and Liquidity Traps," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145469, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Schmidt, Sebastian & Nakata, Taisuke, 2016. "Gradualism and liquidity traps," Working Paper Series 1976, European Central Bank.
- Kohei Hasui, 2021. "How robustness can change the desirability of speed limit policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 68(5), pages 553-570, November.
- Hasui, Kohei & Kobayashi, Teruyoshi & Sugo, Tomohiro, 2021.
"Optimal irreversible monetary policy,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
- Kohei Hasui & Teruyoshi Kobayashi & Tomohiro Sugo, 2021. "Optimal irreversible monetary policy," Discussion Papers 2109, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
- Ida, Daisuke, 2023. "Liquidity-constrained consumers and optimal monetary policy in a currency union," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
- Florin O. Bilbiie, 2019.
"Optimal Forward Guidance,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 310-345, October.
- Bilbiie, Florin, 2016. "Optimal Forward Guidance," CEPR Discussion Papers 11251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Martin Bodenstein & Junzhu Zhao, 2019.
"On Targeting Frameworks And Optimal Monetary Policy,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(8), pages 2077-2113, December.
- Martin Bodenstein & Junzhu Zhao, 2017. "On Targeting Frameworks and Optimal Monetary Policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-098, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Ida, Daisuke & Okano, Mitsuhiro, 2023. "Optimal monetary policy delegation in a small-open new Keynesian model with robust control," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
discretion and commitment; inertia; optimal delegation; stabilization bias; timeless-optimal policy; inflation; output gap growth; nominal income growth targeting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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