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On Targeting Frameworks and Optimal Monetary Policy

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  • Martin Bodenstein
  • Junzhu Zhao

Abstract

Speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently delivers better welfare outcomes than flexible inflation targeting or flexible price level targeting in empirical New Keynesian models when policymakers lack the ability to commit to future policies. Even if the policymaker can commit under an inflation targeting strategy, the discretionary speed limit policy performs better for most empirically plausible model parameterizations from a normative perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Bodenstein & Junzhu Zhao, 2017. "On Targeting Frameworks and Optimal Monetary Policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-098, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2017-98
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2017.098
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    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017098pap.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Budianto, Flora & Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2020. "Average Inflation Targeting and the Interest Rate Lower Bound," CEPR Discussion Papers 14400, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Fackler, James S. & McMillin, W. Douglas, 2020. "Nominal GDP versus price level targeting: An empirical evaluation," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    3. Taisuke Nakata & Sebastian Schmidt & Paul Yoo, 2018. "Speed Limit Policy and Liquidity Traps," IMES Discussion Paper Series 18-E-06, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    4. Punnoose Jacob & Martin Wong, 2018. "Estimating the NAIRU and the Natural Rate of Unemployment for New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Analytical Notes series AN2018/04, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Delegation; Inflation targeting; Optimal monetary policy; Price level targeting; Speed limit policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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