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Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound

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  • Bodenstein, Martin
  • Hebden, James
  • Nunes, Ricardo

Abstract

As the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero, a central bank with imperfect credibility faces a significant challenge to stabilize the economy in a New Keynesian model during a large recession. We characterize the optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate if credibility is imperfect. Confronting monetary policy communication of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Swedish Riksbank with such a framework, the credibility of both institutions is shown to have been low in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Bodenstein, Martin & Hebden, James & Nunes, Ricardo, 2012. "Imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 135-149.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:59:y:2012:i:2:p:135-149 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.01.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis, Richard, 2014. "Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, pages 218-234.
    2. Lasitha R. C. Pathberiya, 2016. "Optimal Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates in a Cost Channel Economy," Discussion Papers Series 568, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    3. Julian A. Parra-Polania & Carmiña O. Vargas, 2014. "Changes in GDP’s measurement error volatility and response of the monetary policy rate: Two approaches," ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE, vol. 32(75), pages 41-47, December.
    4. Davide Debortoli & Jinill Kim & Jesper Linde & Ricardo Nunes, 2016. "Designing a Simple Loss Function for the Fed: Does the Dual Mandate Make Sense?," Discussion Paper Series 1601, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    5. Boneva, Lena & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2015. "Threshold-based forward guidance: hedging the zero bound," Bank of England working papers 561, Bank of England.
    6. repec:bla:jecsur:v:31:y:2017:i:3:p:678-711 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Nakata, Taisuke, 2016. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 220-240.
    8. Ricardo Nunes & Jinill Kim & Jesper Linde & Davide Debortoli, 2014. "Designing a Simple Loss Function for the Fed: Does the Dual Mandate Make Sense?," 2014 Meeting Papers 1043, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Taisuke Nakata, . "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn & Yulin Liu, 2015. "Forward Guidance Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5375, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Haberis, Alex & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matthew, 2017. "Uncertain forward guidance," Bank of England working papers 654, Bank of England.
    12. Taisuke Nakata, . "Reputation and Liquidity Traps," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Maria Lucia Florez-Jimenez & Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2016. "Forward guidance with an escape clause: when half a promise is better than a full one," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(15), pages 1372-1381, March.
    14. Philippe Andrade, 2016. "The heterogeneous interpretation of forward guidance," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, vol. 23, pages 9-14.
    15. Vašíček, Bořek & Žigraiová, Diana & Hoeberichts, Marco & Vermeulen, Robert & Šmídková, Kateřina & de Haan, Jakob, 2017. "Leading indicators of financial stress: New evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 240-257.
    16. Günter Coenen & Anders Warne, 2014. "Risks to Price Stability, the Zero Lower Bound, and Forward Guidance: A Real-Time Assessment," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 7-54, June.
    17. Jones, Callum & Kulish, Mariano, 2013. "Long-term interest rates, risk premia and unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2547-2561.
    18. Sunakawa, Takeki, 2015. "A quantitative analysis of optimal sustainable monetary policies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 119-135.
    19. Andrade, Philippe & Gaballo, Gaetano & Mengus, Eric & Mojon, Benoit, 2018. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," CEPR Discussion Papers 12650, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. P. Andrade & G. Gaballo & E. Mengus & B. Mojon, 2015. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 573, Banque de France.
    21. Sebastian Schmidt, 2013. "Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(7), pages 1335-1350, October.
    22. Lind�, Jesper & Trabandt, Mathias, 2017. "Should We Use Linearized Models To Calculate Fiscal Multipliers?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12533, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. De Graeve, Ferre & Iversen, Jens, 2015. "Central bank policy paths and market forward rates: A simple model," Working Paper Series 303, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    24. Eurilton Araújo, 2016. "Monetary Policy Credibility and the Comovement between Stock Returns and Inflation," Working Papers Series 449, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.

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