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Transparency under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Experiences and Challenges

  • Svensson, Lars E O

I report some personal views and reflections on transparency experiences and transparency challenges following my first year and a half as Deputy Governor at Sveriges Riksbank regarding (1) flexible inflation targeting, (2) the role of transparency in inflation targeting and committee decisions on instrument-rate paths, (3) the management of interest-rate expectations, and (4) the publishing of attributed minutes. I also mention some future developments and improvements in transparency and flexible inflation targeting that I believe would be desirable.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7213.

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Date of creation: Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7213
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  1. Mikael Apel & Anders Vredin, 2007. "Monetary-Policy Communication: The Experience of the Swedish Riksbank," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 499-520, December.
  2. Adolfson, Malin & Laséen, Stefan & Lindé, Jesper & Svensson, Lars E O, 2008. "Optimal Monetary Policy in an Operational Medium-Sized DSGE Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 6907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin & Hui Tong, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 453-455, March.
  4. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
  5. Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  6. Petra M. Geraats, 2009. "Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 235-268, 08.
  7. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 6677, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2011. "Monetary Policy Inclinations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(8), pages 1707-1717, December.
  9. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-172467 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
  11. Alan S. Blinder, 2009. "Making Monetary Policy by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 171-194, 08.
  12. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1038, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  13. Spencer Dale & Athanasios Orphanides & Pär Österholm, 2011. "Imperfect Central Bank Communication: Information versus Distraction," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(2), pages 3-39, June.
  14. Michael Woodford, 2004. "Inflation targeting and optimal monetary policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 15-42.
  15. Lars E.O. Svensson & Michael Woodford, 2000. "Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy," NBER Working Papers 7953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 399-474.
  17. Svensson, L-E-O, 1997. "Inflation Targeting : Some Extensions," Papers 625, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  18. Christiano, Lawrence J. & Trabandt, Mathias & Walentin, Karl, 2007. "Introducing Financial Frictions and Unemployment into a Small Open Economy Model," Working Paper Series 214, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), revised 01 Jun 2011.
  19. Mervyn King, 1994. "Monetary policy in the UK," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 109-28, August.
  20. Svensson, Lars E. O., 2005. "Monetary policy with judgment: forecast targeting," Working Paper Series 0476, European Central Bank.
  21. Jon Faust & Dale W. Henderson, 2004. "Is inflation targeting best-practice monetary policy?," International Finance Discussion Papers 807, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  22. Klein, Paul, 2000. "Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivariate linear rational expectations model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(10), pages 1405-1423, September.
  23. Laurence H. Meyer, 2004. "Practical problems and obstacles to inflation targeting," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 151-160.
  24. Charles Goodhart, 2005. "The interest rate conditioning assumption," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24666, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  25. Giorgio Primiceri & Alejandro Justiniano, 2009. "Potential and natural output," 2009 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  26. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Lars Svensson, 2006. "Optimal Inflation Targeting: Further Developments of Inflation Targeting," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 403, Central Bank of Chile.
  28. Charles Goodhart, 2005. "The Interest Rate Conditioning Assumption," FMG Discussion Papers dp547, Financial Markets Group.
  29. Alan Blinder, 2009. "Talking about monetary policy: the virtues (and vice?) of central bank communication," BIS Working Papers 274, Bank for International Settlements.
  30. King, Mervyn, 1997. "Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in practice," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 81-97, June.
  31. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
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