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Monetary-Policy Communication: The Experience of the Swedish Riksbank

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Abstract

Over the past ten to fifteen years, central banks have begun to communicate more openly. The article describes the Swedish central bank’s communication experiences in two central areas: the role of real stability in monetary policy, and the interest-rate assumption used as a basis for the economic forecasts. One conclusion is that a higher degree of openness, although desirable, often makes the central bank’s message more complex. The communication may therefore be perceived as less clear during a transitory period. Another conclusion is that how open a central bank chooses to be is not an isolated decision that leaves the bank’s practices unaffected in other respects. The degree of openness is likely to have repercussions on the central bank’s internal analyses and decision-making processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikael Apel & Anders Vredin, 2007. "Monetary-Policy Communication: The Experience of the Swedish Riksbank," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 499-520, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:57:y:2007:i:11-12:p:499-520
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    File URL: http://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/storage/1090_fau_11_12_2007_000000000011.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Refet S. Gürkaynak & Andrew T. Levin & Andrew N. Marder & Eric T. Swanson, 2007. "Inflation Targeting and the Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Western Hemisphere," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.), Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edition 1, volume 11, chapter 11, pages 415-465 Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Giuseppe Ferrero & Alessandro Secchi, 2009. "The Announcement of Monetary Policy Intentions," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 720, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. Stanley Fischer, 1996. "Why are central banks pursuing long-run price stability?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-34.
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    Cited by:

    1. Svensson, Lars E O, 2009. "Transparency under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Experiences and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 7213, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Kateøina Šmídková & Aleš Bulíø, 2007. "Striving to Be “Clearly Open” and “Crystal Clear”: Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 540-557, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    central-bank communication; monetary policy; transparency;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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