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Monetary-Policy Communication: The Experience of the Swedish Riksbank

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Abstract

Over the past ten to fifteen years, central banks have begun to communicate more openly. The article describes the Swedish central bank’s communication experiences in two central areas: the role of real stability in monetary policy, and the interest-rate assumption used as a basis for the economic forecasts. One conclusion is that a higher degree of openness, although desirable, often makes the central bank’s message more complex. The communication may therefore be perceived as less clear during a transitory period. Another conclusion is that how open a central bank chooses to be is not an isolated decision that leaves the bank’s practices unaffected in other respects. The degree of openness is likely to have repercussions on the central bank’s internal analyses and decision-making processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikael Apel & Anders Vredin, 2007. "Monetary-Policy Communication: The Experience of the Swedish Riksbank," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 499-520, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:57:y:2007:i:11-12:p:499-520
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    1. Refet S. Gürkaynak & Andrew T. Levin & Andrew N. Marder & Eric T. Swanson, 2007. "Inflation targeting and the anchoring of inflation expectations in the western hemisphere," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 25-47.
    2. de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Rybinski, Krzysztof, 2007. "Central bank transparency and central bank communication: Editorial introduction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-8, March.
    3. Stanley Fischer, 1996. "Why are central banks pursuing long-run price stability?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-34.
    4. Alex Cukierman, 2009. "The Limits of Transparency," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 38(1‐2), pages 1-37, February.
    5. Giuseppe Ferrero & Alessandro Secchi, 2009. "The Announcement of Monetary Policy Intentions," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 720, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kateøina Šmídková & Aleš Bulíø, 2007. "Striving to Be “Clearly Open” and “Crystal Clear”: Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 540-557, December.
    2. Bylund, Emma & Iversen, Jens & Vredin, Anders, 2023. "Monetary policy in Sweden after the end of Bretton Woods," Working Paper Series 429, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    3. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2009. "Transparency under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Experiences and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 7213, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central-bank communication; monetary policy; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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