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Monetary Policy in Chile

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  • Carlos Massad

Abstract

This paper reviews the most important aspects of monetary policy implemented by the Central Bank of Chile since 1990, with special emphasis on its success in achieving lower inflation during this period. Monetary policy in Chile is based on an inflation target and its primary aim is to achieve industnal-country inflation levels. Policy continuity and the independence and credibility of the monetary authority have been key factors in allowing the economy to get ciose to this objective. The analysis of this policy framework and the economy’s macroeconomic performance leads to the conclusión that inflation reduction has not involved significant activity and employment costs. The paper ends by discussing some of the remaining challenges for monetary policy design in Chile.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Massad, 1998. "Monetary Policy in Chile," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 1(1), pages 007-027, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchec:v:1:y:1998:i:1:p:7-27
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    References listed on IDEAS

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