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Information acquisition and transparency in committees

  • Hans Gersbach

    ()

  • Volker Hahn

    ()

We study a two-period model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal's initial utility is higher under transparency, because members exert more effort, which makes correct decisions more likely. The principal also benefits from transparency later, unless transparency leads to an alignment of the signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient committee members. In general, committee members are harmed by transparency.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-011-0295-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 427-453

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:2:p:427-453
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