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Committees, sequential voting and transparency

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  • Hahn, Volker

Abstract

We propose a model of sequential voting in committees, where members use their individual votes to signal high efficiency in their bid to become re-appointed. Transparency precludes efficient information aggregation, and thus decreases the utility of the principal in the first period; it may be beneficial to her in the second period. Under transparency, equilibria under sequential voting always differ from those under simultaneous voting and may lead to more or less efficient information aggregation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hahn, Volker, 2008. "Committees, sequential voting and transparency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 366-385, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:3:p:366-385
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilat Levy, 2007. "Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
    2. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
    3. Trueman, Brett, 1994. "Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 97-124.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2004. "Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16, pages 321-345, November.
    5. Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2007. "On Committees of Experts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(1), pages 337-372.
    6. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September.
    7. Daniel Seidmann, 2011. "A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(1), pages 49-74, January.
    8. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 655-683.
    9. John Fingleton, 2005. "Career Concerns of Bargainers," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 179-204, April.
    10. Steven Callander, 2007. "Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 653-684.
    11. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Sequential voting with abstention," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 445-463, May.
    12. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-479, June.
    13. repec:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:02:p:209-217_06 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Job Swank & Otto Swank & Bauke Visser, 2006. "Transparency and Pre-meetings," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-051/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2012. "Information acquisition and transparency in committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 427-453, May.
    2. Hahn, Volker, 2011. "Sequential aggregation of verifiable information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1447-1454.
    3. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen Weibull, 2008. "Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium," Working Papers halshs-00121741, HAL.
    4. Volker Hahn, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-24, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    5. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0546-6 is not listed on IDEAS

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